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Abstract We investigate the function bias—generalising
words to objects with the same function—in typically
developing (TD) children, children with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) and children with other developmental
disorders. Across four trials, a novel object was named and
its function was described and demonstrated. Children then
selected the other referent from a shape match (same shape,
different function) and function match (same function,
different shape) object. TD children and children with ASD
were ‘function biased’, although further investigation
established that having a higher VMA facilitated function
bias understanding in TD children, but having a lower
VMA facilitated function bias understanding in children
with ASD. This suggests that children with ASD are ini-
tially attuned to object function, not shape.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder  Developmental
disorder  Function bias  Shape bias  Word learning
Introduction
Typically developing (TD) children use both object shape
(the ‘shape bias’, Landau et al. 1988) and function (the
‘function bias’, Gentner 1978) as a basis for lexical
extension to other category members. The shape bias
involves forming word-object mappings according to
similarity in shape, such as calling an unfamiliar object a
‘ball’, due to its prototypical round form, rather than
generalising object labels according to similarity in other
perceptual characteristics, such as colour, texture or size.
Although generally a useful heuristic, there are occasions
where the shape bias could actually hinder word learning.
An orange and a basketball are both spherical but different
types of objects, while a beanbag chair may be round and
an armchair may be larger and squarer shaped, despite
being the same type of object. What unifies objects is not
simply perceptual similarity, but the shared role they fulfil
(Bloom 2004; Keleman 1999). Thus, a bias that constrains
word-object mappings according to similarity in function
can be adaptive (‘function bias’). An unfamiliar object is
called a ‘ball’ not just because of its appearance, but also
because of its role: to bounce, kick or throw.
TD children have been found to show a function bias
when object shape and function conflict. When a novel
object is named and its function is clearly described and
demonstrated, children extend the label to a differently
shaped object that shares the same function, rather than to a
similarly shaped one with a separate function (e.g. Die-
sendruck et al. 2003; Merriman et al. 1993). This attention
to function strengthens with chronological age (CA) in
typical development, and may also be dependent on an
individual’s non-verbal skills or language ability. Specifi-
cally, children have to notice that different objects share
the same function, and that these objects also tend to share
the same name, which may respectively recruit both these
abilities. The role of language and non-verbal skills can be
directly addressed by comparing performance of TD chil-
dren with children who have different developmental tra-
jectories in terms of these skills, particularly children with
autism spectrum disorder (ASD).
Although four studies have directly addressed the
absence of (see Hartley and Allen 2014; Potrzeba et al.
2015; Tek et al. 2008), or delay in acquiring (see Field
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et al. 2015), a shape bias in ASD, to our knowledge no
research to date has investigated the function bias in this
population. Thus, the current study aims to fill this gap in
the literature. There are reasons to believe that children
with ASD might show differences relative to TD children
with respect to understanding object function. For instance,
abundant evidence suggests that children with ASD often
demonstrate idiosyncratic, stereotyped and restricted arte-
fact use (Ozonoff et al. 2008; Wulff 1985). This includes
repetitively spinning the wheels on a car or trickling sand
and water between their fingers, lining objects up in rows
or piling objects on top of each other, and spinning,
rotating, rolling, mouthing and banging artefacts (Leekam
et al. 2011; Ozonoff et al. 2008; Williams et al. 1999).
These unusual responses to objects may hinder children’s
discovery of the artefact’s proper function (Loveland 1991;
Williams et al. 1999).
As children with ASD have weak central coherence and
a preference for component parts rather than the object
gestalt (Frith 1989; Happe and Frith 2006), they might be
so fixated on manipulating the parts of objects that they fail
to comprehend the overall role that objects fulfil. For
example, repeatedly spinning the wheels on a toy car dis-
tracts the child from the car’s true function of driving. The
function bias also involves attending to and remembering
the function of new artefacts and comparing this informa-
tion to previously stored knowledge about object functions.
This may be difficult for children with ASD because of
impairments with prototype formation (Klinger and Daw-
son 2001) and categorisation (Gastgeb et al. 2006, 2011).
Furthermore, children with ASD experience referential
intent difficulties (Prizant and Wetherby 1987) and the
function bias has been linked to intentional understanding
(Diesendruck et al. 2003).
Therefore, it is possible that children with ASD have a
function bias delay (develop the function bias later than TD
individuals) or deviance (fail to develop the function bias at
all). Children with ASD exhibit delay or deviance in other
areas of language acquisition (e.g. Bartolucci et al. 1976;
Eigsti and Bennetto 2009; Howlin 1984; Mitchell et al.
2006; VanMeter et al. 1997) and are delayed showing a
shape bias (Field et al. 2015). In order to establish if ASD
involves a function bias delay or deviance, testing a cohort
of children with wide variation in language ability is
necessary.
Despite some studies suggesting a function bias deficit
in ASD, other evidence suggests children with ASD might
show the heuristic. For instance, they show other word
learning constraints and biases, such as mutual exclusivity
(Preissler and Carey 2005) and the noun bias (Swensen
et al. 2007). They also classify objects by function to the
same extent as their TD peers (Tager-Flusberg 1985;
Ungerer and Sigman 1987). In Tager-Flusberg (1985),
children viewed a test picture (e.g. a car) then a picture
from the same category (e.g. a bus) and a distractor picture
from a different category (e.g. an item of clothing). The
children with ASD were able to correctly categorise not
only perceptually similar objects (such as different types of
dogs) but also functionally but not perceptually related
objects (such as different types of furniture) into their
correct category. Ungerer and Sigman (1987) also found
that children with ASD categorised objects according to
functional similarity (e.g. different animals, fruits, vehicles
and furniture) as well as the more perceptually salient
characteristics of colour and form. This suggests that
children with ASD have some understanding that the same
type of objects have the same function.
Children with ASD also partake in functional play
(Baron-Cohen 1987; Leslie 1987; Libby et al. 1998;
Ungerer and Sigman 1981), such as brushing one’s hair
with a toy brush, holding a telephone to one’s ear and
sweeping the floor with a toy broom. Functional play helps
children name things, learn how to use objects appropri-
ately and make associations between the roles of different
artefacts (Mastrangelo 2009). Being able to classify objects
by function and take part in functional play suggests that
children with ASD have a basic level of understanding
about the role objects fulfil.
Therefore, there is conflicting evidence regarding func-
tional understanding in children with ASD. To examine
whether any differences which may emerge in terms of
showing the function bias in ASD relative to TD children
are simply a result of cognitive delay, rather than ASD per
se, it is necessary to also examine the function bias in
children with other developmental disorders (DD). Like
children with ASD, children with DD categorise objects by
the function they fulfil (Ungerer and Sigman 1987) and
engage in functional play (Malone and Langone 1998;
Sigafoos et al. 1999), suggesting they have some functional
understanding.
However, there is mixed evidence for the use of word
learning constraints in this population. Some children with
DD show a shape bias in naming contexts (Field et al.
2015) and use mutual exclusivity for novel word learning
(Wilkinson and Albert 2001; Wilkinson 2005). Other
studies report that children who are ‘late talkers’ have a
shape bias deficit (Jones 2003), and children with intel-
lectual disability have difficulty with fast mapping and are
less able than TD children to maintain labels when tested
1–3 days later (Wilkinson 2005). Thus, testing children
with DD can inform theories of language acquisition in this
population, as well as elucidate whether potential differ-
ences in ASD stem from cognitive delay.
To investigate the function bias, we based our task on
Diesendruck et al. (2003), who found that 3-year-old TD
children form word-object mappings by function rather
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than shape, but only when object function is explicitly
described and demonstrated. In the ‘label ? intended
function’ condition, participants were presented with a
novel object, which was labelled and its function was
clearly articulated and demonstrated to the children. For
example, the experimenter stated ‘this is a wug and it can
hold coins’ and then poured some coins into the object. The
function of the novel object and the two test objects were
also described and demonstrated (i.e. it was made explicitly
clear to the children that the shape match was the same
shape as the novel object but performed a different func-
tion, while the function match was a different shape but
performed the same function). When asked to give the
experimenter the other ‘wug’, the children chose the
function match test object.
Although we kept the procedure of our study the same as
Diesendruck et al. (2003), we recruited a large sample of
participants of varying ages, due to the controversy within
the TD literature regarding the precise age of function bias
onset. It is generally agreed that by adulthood TD indi-
viduals show a function bias rather than shape bias when
shape and function conflict (Graham et al. 1999; Jones
1998; Landau et al. 1998), however it is unknown at what
age this ability appears. Although Diesendruck et al. (2003)
claim that TD children show a function bias at 3-years-old
(see also Kemler-Nelson et al. 2000, who found a function
bias in 4-year-old children and Kemler-Nelson et al. 2000
who found a function bias in 2-year-olds), others argue that
the function bias does not develop until age 6 (Merriman
et al. 1993) or even later (Gathercole and Whitfield 2001).
It is predicted that TD and DD children will override the
shape bias in favour of a function bias, replicating Die-
sendruck et al. (2003). Our first hypothesis is that TD and
DD children will show a clear understanding of the latter.
We expected that children with ASD would show a func-
tion bias deficit, due to idiosyncratic object use. However,
as children with ASD categorise objects by function and
engage in functional play, an alternative possibility is that
they show a function bias. It is also possible that children’s
performance on Diesendruck’s task is related to the child’s
language level, replicating Merriman et al. (1993). Our
second hypothesis is therefore that the function bias does
not develop until children have reached a higher level of
receptive understanding.
Method
Participants
One-hundred-and-twenty-four children were recruited (see
Table 1 for the background and test data from the three
groups of participants). The participants were recruited
from four mainstream and 12 specialist schools, one ASD
class within a mainstream school, two parental support
groups and 3 day nurseries across the North West of
England and from a database of parents who had previ-
ously expressed an interest in their children participating in
psychology research at Lancaster University. Participants
were matched according to the group mean verbal mental
age (VMA). Although the DD children had a slightly lower
VMA than the other two groups (see Table 1), a one-way
ANOVA showed that this was not significant. The DD
children had various conditions, primarily intellectual
disability and rare chromosomal disorders. Lancaster
University Research Ethics Committee granted ethical
permission for the study to take place. Written informed
consent was obtained from children’s parent or guardian.
Cognitive Tests
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale—Second Edition
(BPVS-II; Dunn et al. 1997) was administered to determine
children’s VMA.1 Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices
(Raven’s 2003) was administered to determine children’s
nonverbal reasoning abilities. The Raven’s has a minimum
raw score of 0 and a maximum of 36.
Clinical Diagnoses
All children with ASD had received a prior clinical diag-
nosis of autism by a qualified educational or clinical psy-
chologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism
Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic
Interview—Revised: Lord et al. 1994, 2002) and expert
clinical judgment. Inclusion in the final sample was based
on these specialist diagnoses, derived from the DSM-IV-
TR. However, for most children, the Childhood Autism
Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler et al. 1988) and the lifetime
version of the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ;
Rutter et al. 2003) were also completed by a parent or
teacher (CARS: 21 TD, 46 ASD, 19 DD. SCQ: 19 TD, 46
ASD, 22 DD) in order to provide an additional character-
isation of the sample. Scores on the CARS range from 15 to
60, with scores of 30 ? in the ASD range. Scores on the
SCQ range from 0 to 39, with scores of 15 ? in the ASD
range. The vast majority of children scored according to
their diagnosis on the scales with just four children (3 ASD,
1 DD) not scoring according to their diagnosis on either
questionnaire. As excluding these children from the
1 One child with ASD had a raw score on the BPVS slightly below
the basal start point of 2.33. However, as he scored 14 on the BPVS,
where a raw score of 15 equates to a VMA of 2.33, this child was
conservatively assigned a VMA of 2.25 based upon his raw score.
1212 J Autism Dev Disord (2016) 46:1210–1219
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analyses yielded almost identical results, these participants
were included in the final sample.
With two exceptions, all of the DD children had
received a formal diagnosis of their disorder. The data from
the remaining two DD children were not excluded from the
study because, in addition to attending a specialist school,
their VMA (3.67 and 3.75 respectively) was considerably
younger than their CA (10.75 and 10.83 respectively). The
possibility that these children had undiagnosed ASD was
ruled out by both children scoring below the clinical
threshold for ASD on both the CARS and SCQ
questionnaires.
Materials
A total of twelve objects were presented to the children
across four trials (see Fig. 1). The functions of the objects
largely followed those used by Diesendruck et al. (2003).
However, there were some minor adaptations, in order to
make the study more culturally relevant. For example, the
function of ‘cutting clay’ was changed to ‘cutting
playdough’.
Diesendruck et al. (2003) included within their study
several objects where the name would already be familiar
to the children (e.g. a solid wooden block, a rectangular
box and a piece of wood), alongside more novel items (e.g.
hanger-like shapes made out of pipe cleaner and wire, a
round disk made out of felt). In line with this, some of our
objects were more familiar to the children than others,
although the objects were used to perform functions that
they were not typically associated with. No child in our
study volunteered a name for any of the stimuli.
Procedure
Participants completed the task individually in a quiet place
within their school, day nursery, parental support group or
the Centre for Research in Human Development and
Learning (CRHDL), Lancaster University. The methodol-
ogy followed Diesendruck et al. (2003), replicating their
dialogue when introducing the novel object, function match
and shape match. The experimenter presented the novel
object and stated ‘this is a jop (cheem/kiv/glire) and it was
made for cutting playdough (holding coins/dusting/making
music). See how it cuts playdough (holds coins/dusts/makes
music)’. The experimenter then demonstrated this function,
by producing some playdough and cutting it with the object
(pouring a selection of coins into the object/moving the
object around on the table in a dusting motion/banging a
highlighter against the object to make a sound) and then
placed it upon the table.
Introducing the function match test object, the experi-
menter said ‘see this one? It can cut playdough because it
was made for cutting playdough.’ The experimenter
demonstrated this function, by cutting the playdough, then
continued ‘see, it doesn’t look like this one [pointing to the
original], they have a different shape. It can cut playdough
because it was made for cutting playdough.’ The experi-
menter demonstrated this function for a second time.
Introducing the shape match test object, the experimenter
said ‘see this one? It can’t cut playdough because it was
made for mopping up water (sticking/hanging hair ties/
holding paperclips)’. The experimenter demonstrated this
function, by pouring a tiny amount of water onto the
table and mopping it up, then continued ‘See, it looks like
this one [pointing to the original], they are the same shape.
It can’t cut playdough because it was made for mopping up
water’ [demonstrating this function for the second time].
Following this, the experimenter picked up the novel
object and said ‘remember I told you that this is a jop and it
was made for cutting playdough. One of these [pointing to
the test objects] is also a jop. Which one of these is a jop?’
The word uttered to refer to the novel object, the order that
the test objects were presented, the order that the function
Table 1 Background
information and mean
proportion of function match
responses for the three groups of
participants
TD N = 45, 22 males ASD N = 51, 45 males DD N = 28,15 males
Mean CA (SD) 4.63 (1.44) 9.60 (3.35) 9.27 (2.32)
Range 2.00–7.00 4.33–17.42 5.17–15.58
Mean VMA (SD) 5.33 (2.08) 5.25 (1.98) 4.43 (1.84)
Range 2.75–11.67 2.25–11.58 2.33–8.83
Mean Ravens score (SD) 13.93 (7.44) 18.39 (8.49) 10.58 (6.88)
Range 4.00–32.00 0.00–36.00 2.00–31.00
Mean CARS score (SD) 16.36 (2.16) 34.70 (7.48) 24.18 (4.93)
Range 15.00–22.50 20.00–53.00 16.00–32.00
Mean SCQ score (SD) 2.47 (3.73) 18.65 (6.70) 7.00 (5.26)
Range 0.00–12.00 5.00–34.00 1.00–21.00
Function bias score (SD) .66 (.37) .56 (.33) .45 (.29)
Range 0–1 0–1 0–1
J Autism Dev Disord (2016) 46:1210–1219 1213
123
match and shape match were introduced and the position-
ing of the test objects on the table (left or right) were all
counterbalanced. One TD child, two children with ASD
and one DD child only completed three out of the four
trials and one TD child only completed one out of the four
trials, due to inattention.
Results
The data were analysed in three ways. Firstly, following
Diesendruck et al.’s (2003) non-parametric approach, we
classed participants as ‘function biased’ (selected the
function match for three or four trials), ‘shape biased’
(selected the shape match for three or four trials) or ‘not
biased’ (selected the function match and shape match for
two trials each) (see Table 2). One sample Chi Square
analyses showed that the TD children (23/44) and those
with ASD (24/51), but not children with DD (7/28), were
function biased at a rate above chance [TD, v2(2, N =
44) = 11.77, p = .003, w = .49; ASD, v2(2, N = 51) =
8.50, p = .014, w = .41; DD v2(2, N = 28) = 3.01,
p = .22].
We then conducted a series of logistic regressions on
whether the children were function biased or not using
VMA, Raven’s, and group membership as explanatory
factors. The saturated model was significant and we
therefore extracted variables to find the best-fit model. This
showed that the model was highly significant
[v2(4) = 19.22, p = .001; Nagelkerke R2 = .19]. There
were main effects for Group [Wald(2) = 8.43, p = .015]
with follow up analysis showing that this was explained by
a significant difference between the TD and DD groups
[Wald(1) = 4.2, p = .04]. In addition there was a VMA by
Group interaction [Wald(2) = 9.77, p = .008], accounted
Fig. 1 The four object sets. Novel objects (centre) (from left to right,
with designated function in brackets): puppet stand covered with Mr.
Sheen duster (dusting), silver sandpaper covered soap dish (cutting
playdough), unaltered green bowl (holding coins), black jelly mould
(making music). Function match test objects (left): dish brush, cutter,
soap holder, soap dish. Shape match test objects (right) (with
designated function in brackets): puppet stand painted blue (hanging
hair ties), soap dish covered with blue towel (mopping up water),
bowl with plastic cover around the top (sticking), red jelly mould
(holding paperclips) (Color figure online)
Table 2 Percentage of children who were function biased, shape
biased and not biased using Diesendruck’s scoring procedure
TD ASD DD
Function biased 53.30** 47.10* 25.00
Shape biased 28.90 33.30 46.40
Not biased 17.80 19.60 28.60
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01
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for by a difference between ASD and TD children in terms
of their language levels [Wald(1) = 8.24, p = .004] (see
Fig. 2). This analysis suggests that the likelihood of being
classified as function biased is determined by group
membership and language level in different ways. For TD
children, higher VMA facilitates function bias under-
standing. In contrast, for children with ASD, lower VMA
facilitates function bias understanding.
Our second set of analyses used a parametric approach
in order to explore more fully the relationship between
performance on the series of test trials with regards to
group membership (TD, DD and ASD) and the background
factors (VMA and Raven’s) as continuous covariates. We
averaged the four trials to construct a proportional scale of
success on the function bias questions, with a range of 0–1.
Proportions were used instead of frequencies as five chil-
dren did not complete all trials. Preliminary investigations
of the data suggested that the children’s VMA (as mea-
sured by the BPVS) appeared to relate to their performance
on the function bias task, with the direction of this rela-
tionship varying according to group. In the TD and DD
samples the two sets of scores appear to be positively
related, while in the ASD children there seemed to be a
slight negative relationship (see Fig. 2).
We conducted a linear mixed effects model using Group
(TD, ASD, DD) as a fixed factor and BPVS scores and
Raven’s test data as continuous covariates. This showed no
main effects (Group: F(2,32) = .84; Raven’s: F(1,25) =
2.45; VMA: F(59,24) = .52, all NS). There was a
Group 9 VMA interaction (F(24,35) = 2.03, p = .042,
gp
2 = .66). We followed this up by performing for each
group a linear regression to examine the relationship
between VMA and function bias scores. These showed that
for the children with ASD and DD children the slopes were
non-significant (F\ 1.6), but for the TD children there was
a clear association between the two scores (F(.43) = 6.88,
p = .012: B = .07 (SE = .03), Beta = .37) (see Fig. 2).
This suggested that the interaction is accounted for by the
association in the TD children and not the two other
groups.
Finally, we conducted three further checks on the data.
First, unsurprisingly, there were far more males in the ASD
group than the other two groups, which is reflective of the
fact that more males than females are diagnosed with ASD
(e.g. Fombonne 2003). However, as it is unknown whether
gender has an effect on children’s function bias responses,
following Hartley and Allen (2014), we carried out two
follow up analyses to test for any gender effects. A 3
(Group: TD, ASD, DD) 9 2 (Gender: Male or Female)
Factorial ANOVA revealed no effect of Gender. We also
re-ran all analyses including only the male children for the
TD participants and replicated our findings.
Secondly, we wanted to establish if children’s object
selection differed across object sets, as the novel objects
for the ‘holding coins’ (green bowl) and ‘making music’
(jelly mould) trials might have been more familiar to the
children than the novel objects for the ‘dusting’ (duster)
and ‘cutting playdough’ (playdough cutter) trials. Despite
Fig. 2 Scatterplots of VMA by
function match responses
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this replicating Diesendruck et al. (2003), which contained
a mixture of familiar and unfamiliar stimuli, we wanted to
ensure that children were responding the same for the
‘familiar’ and ‘novel’ object sets. A paired samples t test
found no significant differences between children’s
responses for the two ‘novel’ compared with the two ‘fa-
miliar’ object sets for any of the three groups.
As a third precaution, we investigated if children’s
responses were consistent across all object sets. Children’s
responses were categorised for each trial separately as
‘shape match’ or ‘function match’. A Friedman test con-
firmed that there were no significant differences in terms of
children’s responses per object set for any of the three
groups.
Discussion
Function plays an important role in children’s artefact
categorisation. However, the exact age at which function
overrides shape in children’s naming generalisations, is
debateable, with some studies suggesting 3-years-old (e.g.
Diesendruck et al. 2003), although others argue six (e.g.
Merriman et al. 1993). Furthermore, the function bias has
never before been explored in atypically developing par-
ticipants, such as children with ASD. The tests against
chance performance suggest that TD children and partici-
pants with ASD show a function bias. In keeping with the
idea that this effect emerges in development, TD children
appear to appreciate the role of functional information for
lexical extension with more proficient receptive language
ability. This is not the case for children with ASD, who
may have a different route to word learning; forming word-
object mappings by function to begin with. The emergence
of the function bias in TD children will be considered first.
The results for the DD children reveal a fundamental dif-
ficulty with function understanding and inform us about the
role of cognitive delay in ASD. We will explore the DD
findings before looking specifically how function might
facilitate language acquisition in children with ASD.
The results do not directly contradict Diesendruck et al.
(2003), who found that 3-year-old TD children showed a
function bias. Nevertheless, the TD participants in this
study, on average, possessed a higher CA (over four) and
VMA (over five) than the 3-year-olds recruited in the
former study. Our findings suggest that attention to the
functional qualities of objects gradually develops, and are
consistent with findings that TD children do not generalise
according to function until they are older than three (e.g.
Graham et al. 1999; Imai et al. 1994; Tomikowa and Dodd
1980; Matan and Carey 2001; Merriman et al. 1993). The
likely conclusion here is that the function bias is truly slow
to emerge across typical development given the focus on
shape and other features of a perceptual array in early
language acquisition (e.g. Horst and Twomey 2013; Lan-
dau et al. 1992, 1988; Tek et al. 2012).
A surprising feature of the results is that DD children did
not use function for word-object mapping across the range
of VMAs that we explored. It is possible that the language
used within the procedure was too complex for DD par-
ticipants. Following Diesendruck et al. (2003), the para-
digm contained detailed verbal instruction, and children
had to retain the pairings between objects and corre-
sponding function in working memory. We chose to remain
faithful to the procedure, although future work should
consider adapting task instructions to minimise the verbal
component, as it is possible that the extent of dialogue was
difficult for the DD children.
It is also the case that VMA was only measured using
the BPVS. This is in keeping with studies within the ASD
literature (e.g. Allen and Chambers 2011; Lee and Hobson
2006; Leekam et al. 1998). However, the BPVS only
measures single word receptive vocabulary and it is
unknown if the groups were matched on skills such as
pragmatic skills, grammar and expressive vocabulary.
Future research should aim to measure additional aspects
of language than simply receptive language comprehen-
sion, in order to tease apart whether other skills are facil-
itating function bias understanding in the other two groups,
relative to the DD children.
A further possibility is that the DD children show a
fundamental impairment in understanding what objects
were made for. Some research supports this proposal. For
example, children with intellectual impairment are able to
sort objects into categories (Ungerer and Sigman 1987), but
they actually perform worse than TD children and children
with ASD for superordinate level category matching, par-
ticularly for artifactual categories (Tager-Flusberg 1985).
This may pervade other areas of language development,
including categorisation and play. Thus, clinical and edu-
cational programmes should account for this potential
problem. It is also conceivable that differences in infor-
mation processing abilities amongst individuals with DD
(Sperber and McCauley 1984), which we did not directly
measure, underlie the difficulty the DD group had with
understanding the task. There is evidence that individuals
with intellectual impairment do not spontaneously abstract
relations between pairs of objects (see Paour 1992), and
have specific difficulties in working memory (Numminen
et al. 2002).
The results of the DD group implicate cognitive delay as
the primary source of function bias failure, and based upon
the cognitive abilities of our ASD sample, we would also
expect impairment across the board in this group. How-
ever, our children with ASD were able to pass this task and
logistic regression analysis suggests that, in this group, a
1216 J Autism Dev Disord (2016) 46:1210–1219
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lower receptive language facilitated performance. Why
were children with ASD able to match according to func-
tion, while their peers with DD appeared unable to do so? It
could be the case that the task was set up to allow low level
processes to operate in the ASD sample. Repeatedly
emphasising and clearly demonstrating the object’s func-
tion may have facilitated function bias understanding.
We can think of several other reasons to explain this
finding. First, children with ASD engage in functional play
(Baron-Cohen 1987; Jarrold et al. 1993; Libby et al. 1998),
which necessitates understanding of an object’s true or
intended function (i.e. flying a toy helicopter in the air).
Another potential explanation is that our findings reflect a
specific strength in ASD during a critical early period of
development. Shah and Frith (1983) identified ‘islets of
ability’ in ASD in terms of relative strengths in block
design tasks. It may be the case that during the earlier
stages of language acquisition, children with ASD focus
heavily upon the features of objects, and given the rigorous
nature and reinforcement of some early intervention pro-
grams (Anderson et al. 1987; Lovaas 1987; Vernon et al.
2012), also pay special attention to an adult’s instruction.
Of course, there are limitations to our work. Although
we did not find differences between trials that incorporated
completely novel objects relative to those that retained
some familiarity, future work should utilise a uniform set
of stimuli. It would also be advantageous to test more
verbally able children with ASD, to generalise our findings
across the spectrum and determine whether the function
bias is present in individuals whose CA is on a par with
their VMA. We advise caution in interpreting our findings
because although we found a significant interaction
specifically accounted for by the differences between
children with ASD and TD children using logistic regres-
sion, the interaction revealed by the linear mixed effects
model appears to be driven by the stronger association
between VMA and function bias scores in TD children. A
final limitation is that our DD group included a wide
variety of conditions, and future research should aim to
explore the function bias in a more homogeneous sample,
such as a whole cohort of children with Down Syndrome or
a whole cohort of children with intellectual disabilities.
This will help tease apart whether subgroups of DD chil-
dren show the function bias or a function bias deficit is
widespread among DD children.
Despite these limitations, our study was the first to
investigate the function bias in atypically developing
children. Thus, it provides a basis for further work
exploring the role of functional information versus shape-
based generalisations across development. That children
with ASD appear to show the function bias where matched
controls with DD do not merits further and deeper
investigation.
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